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Abstract
Two Party Immediate Response Disputes (TPI-disputes) are one class of dialogue or argument
game in which the protagonists take turns producing counter arguments to the ‘most recent’ argument
advanced by their opponent. Argument games have been found useful as a means of modelling
dialectical discourse and in providing semantic bases for proof theoretic aspects of reasoning. In
this article we consider a formalisation of TPI-disputes in the context of finite Argument Systems.
Our principal concern may, informally, be phrased as follows: given a specific argument system, H,
and argument x withinH, what can be stated concerning the number of moves a dispute might take
for one of its protagonists to accept that x has some defence respectively cannot be defended?
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1. Introduction
In this paper we are concerned with two important formalisms that have been the
subject of much interest with respect to their application in modelling dialectical process:
Argument Systems [17], and Argument Games [22,29]. Our principal concern is with the
length of disputes when they are conducted in accordance with the etiquette prescribed by
a particular formal protocol. The protocol of interest—TPI-dispute—was outlined in the
work of [38] and in Section 1.2 we present a rigorous formalisation of this with examples
of its operation being described in Section 2. The main technical concerns are dealt with
in Section 3, wherein two questions are examined. Informally, these may be viewed as
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follows: suppose we are presented with an argument system and an argument within this.
If it is required to observe the dispute rules prescribed in some dispute protocol,
(a) when the given argument can be defended, how many moves could it take to prove to
a challenging party that the argument may be defended against any attack?
(b) when the given argument cannot be defended against all possible attacks, how many
moves must it take to convince putative defenders that their position is untenable?
We obtain a precise characterisation answering (a) (Theorem 4, below). In the case
of (b), by developing a construction similar to that used in [16], the question is related
to the widely studied issue of Proof Complexity. Specifically, we demonstrate that by
representing an unsatisfiable CNF-formula, ϕ, as an argument system the dispute protocol
defines a proof calculus that may be employed to show ¬ϕ is a propositional tautology.
Thus, we obtain a partial answer to (b) (in Theorem 5) by establishing that when interpreted
as a calculus for Propositional Logic, the TPI-dispute protocol is ‘not very powerful’:
formally we show that it may be efficiently simulated by a Gentzen system in which the
CUT inference rule is not available.
In the remainder of this section we review the Argument System formalism from [17]
and formally develop the argument game TPI-dispute, originally outlined in [38]. In
Section 2 some illustrative examples of how disputes evolve in this protocol are presented.
As we have already noted, Section 3 presents the core technical contribution, while
Section 4 discusses some issues arising from our results and presents some directions for
further work. Conclusions are given in Section 5.
1.1. Argument systems
Argument systems as a mechanism for studying formalisations of reasoning, acceptabil-
ity, and defeasibility were introduced by Dung [17] and have since received considerable
attention with respect to their use in non-classical logics, e.g., [8,13–15]. The basic defini-
tion of finite argument system below is derived from that given in [17].
Definition 1. An argument system is a pair H= 〈X ,A〉, in which X is a set of arguments
and A⊂ X × X is the attack relationship for H. A pair 〈x, y〉 ∈A is referred to as ‘y is
attacked by x’ or ‘x attacks (or is an attacker of ) y’. The range of an argument x—denoted
range(x)—is the set of arguments that are attacked by x; the range of a set of arguments
S, is the union over all x in S of range(x).
For R, S subsets of X in H(〈X ,A〉), we say that
(a) s ∈ S is attacked by R if there is some r ∈ R such that 〈r, s〉 ∈A.
(b) x ∈ X is acceptable with respect to S if for every y ∈ X that attacks x there is some
z ∈ S that attacks y .
(c) S is conflict-free if no argument in S is attacked by any other argument in S.
(d) A conflict-free set S is admissible if every argument in S is acceptable with respect
to S.
(e) S is a preferred extension if it is a maximal (with respect to ⊆) admissible set.
(f) S is a stable extension if S is conflict free and every argument y /∈ S is attacked by S.
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While some argument systems may not have any stable extension, it is always the case
that some preferred extension is present: the reason being that the empty set is always
admissible.
Definition 2. The decision problem Credulous Acceptance (CA) takes as an instance: an
argument system H = 〈X ,A〉 and an argument x ∈ X . The result true is returned if and
only if at least one preferred extension S of X contains x . If CA(〈H, x〉) holds then x is
said to be credulously accepted in H.
The decision problem Sceptical Acceptance (SA) takes as an instance: an argument
system H = 〈X ,A〉 and an argument x ∈ X . The result true is returned if and only if
every preferred extension S in X contains x . If SA(〈H, x〉) holds x is said to be sceptically
accepted in H.
1.2. Argument games and TPI-disputes
A widely studied concept that has received some attention in the context of argument
systems is that of employing argument games both as models of dialectical discourse
and as a basis for a formal proof theory. The form of such games involves a sequence
of interactions between two protagonists—hereafter referred to as the Defender (D) and
Challenger (C)—wherein the Defender attempts to establish a particular argument in
the face of counterarguments advanced by the Challenger, see, e.g., [10,24,26,29,37]. In
[38] descriptions of games—Two Party Immediate Response Disputes (TPI-disputes)—are
presented for Credulous and Sceptical Argument within the framework considered in the
present article. We consider a rather more tightly specified definition of TPI-disputes: the
form presented in [38] defines notions of move, attack, winning and losing within a dispute.
These, however, are illustrated through a series of examples rather than presenting a precise
semantics for the game as a whole. Our main point of interest concerns the fact that whilst
such games always terminate for finitely specified systems we wish to address how many
steps (as a function of |X |) some disputes may take.
We begin by developing the idea of TPI-disputes, using as a basis the informal schema
of [38]. In informal terms, a TPI-dispute starts from a named argument, x in a given
argument system H. For the Credulous Game, a defender attempts to construct an
admissible set containing x . For a select class of Argument Systems,1 Sceptical Acceptance
can be established by the Defender proving that no attacker of x is credulously accepted.
The Challenger’s aim is to prevent successful construction. The game proceeds by the
players alternately presenting arguments within H that attack the previous arguments
proposed by the other player. The concept of immediate response concerns the requirement
in the game for both players to identify arguments that attack the most recent argument put
forward by the opponent. A number of examples given in [38] indicate that both players
must have the capability of ‘back-tracking’, e.g., if the line of attack followed by the
Challenger fails, it must be possible to adopt a different attack on some previous argument.
We can view the progress of such disputes as a sequence of directed trees each of which
is constructed by a depth-first expansion, the root of each tree being the argument x at the
1 But not all, cf. Theorem 3, and Fig. 1 subsequently.
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heart of the dispute. In this way the game is characterised by the moves through which a
tree is expanded and the rules which force back-tracking by either party.
1.2.1. A model of TPI-disputes
Definition 3. Let H(〈X ,A〉) be an argument system and x an argument in X . A dispute
tree for x in H, THx , is a tree whose vertices are a subset of X and whose root is x . The
edges of a dispute tree are directed from vertices to their parent vertex. If t is a leaf vertex
in THx the path
t = vk → vk−1 →·· ·→ v2 → v1 → v0 = x
is called a dispute line.
A dispute line (to v) is a failing attack on x if the number of vertices on the path from
v up to (and including) x is odd. A dispute line is a failing defence of x if this number is
even.
A vertex, v, is open in THx if there is an argument, w in X , which attacks v and is
‘available’ (in a sense which is made precise below). If no such argument exists, v is
closed. A dispute line is closed or open according to whether its leaf vertex is closed or
open.
Given a system H(〈X ,A〉) and x ∈ X a TPI-dispute consists of a sequence of moves
M = 〈µ1,µ2, . . . ,µi, . . .〉.
Moves, µ are chosen from a finite repertoire of move types, some (or all) of which may not
be available (depending on the current ‘state’ of a dispute). This state is represented after
the kth move (k  0), by a tuple σk = 〈Tk, vk,∆k,Γk,Pk,Qk〉. Here
Tk : the dispute tree after k moves;
vk : the ‘current’ argument (vertex of) Tk ;
∆k : arguments available to D;
Γk : arguments available to C;
Pk : arguments proposed as a (subset) of some admissible set by D;
Qk : the set of subsets of arguments that C has shown not to be a subset of an admissible
set.
The initial state (σ0) is 〈〈x〉, x,∆0,Γ0,P0,Q0〉 where
∆0 =X /
({x} ∪ {y: 〈x, y〉 ∈A or 〈y, x〉 ∈A}),
Γ0 =X /
({x} ∪ range(x)),
P0 = {x},
Q0 = ∅.
A dispute, M = 〈µ1,µ2, . . . ,µk〉, is active if there is a legal move µk+1 available to the
current player, i.e., C if k+ 1 is odd, D otherwise. A dispute, M , is terminated if M is not
active. For a terminated dispute, we use |M| to denote the number of moves in M .
In informal terms the ‘state’ describes the progress so far of a dispute over the
argument x . The defender is attempting to construct in the subset Pk an admissible set
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containing x . In order to achieve this, D, has to respond to attacks put forward by C so that
(if k is odd), the argument vk requires D to employ an ‘available’ argument in ∆k to attack
vk : the chosen argument will form the component vk+1 of the next state. The Challenger in
attempting to show that x is not credulously accepted maintains a set of subsets of X (the
set Qk) comprising subsets that cannot form part of an admissible set with x .
Before defining the move repertoire we outline the notions of ‘availability’ that are
used. Suppose D must find an argument z with which to attack vk proposed by C, i.e.,
with 〈z, vk〉 ∈A. Since D aims to construct an admissible set, certainly any z that conflicts
with any argument in Pk cannot be used—Pk must be conflict-free. In addition, should z be
such that Pk ∪{z} has already been shown not to be an admissible set, i.e., for some S ∈Qk
it holds that S ⊆ Pk ∪{z}, then z cannot be used to counter-attack vk . Thus, in summary, an
argument is ‘available’ to D if it attacks the most recent argument put forward by C, does
not conflict with any argument that D is currently defending and can be added to this set
without forming a ‘known’ inadmissible set. Similarly, C, in finding a counterattack to vk
needs to identify some z that attacks vk and is not attacked by any argument in Pk . Thus
the ‘available’ arguments for C at any point are simply those that are not attacked by any
argument in Pk .
A detailed description of how the sets of available arguments develop between moves
is given when we describe the move repertoire.
1.2.2. The move repertoire
It remains to describe the move repertoire, conditions determining applicability, and
consequent changes to σi−1 after performing a move µi .
The various implementations of argument games allow a variety of different moves.
Some, such as [25], provide a small number of basic moves, intended to model disputes
in a generic manner, while others allow a larger number in order to attempt to reflect
the moves made by the participants in particular kinds of dispute, e.g., [22] or to reflect
particular notions of what constitutes an argument. For example Bench-Capon [6] models
arguments as described by Toulmin [34]. Since our framework uses Dung’s very abstract
notion of argument [17], we do not need moves to reflect particular procedures or forms of
argument, and so can use a rather small set of moves.
The repertoire of moves2 we allow comprises just,
{COUNTER, BACKUP, RETRACT}.
The first move can be made by either player, whereas BACKUP is only employed by C, and
RETRACT only by D. These two moves arise from the need to allow back-tracking. In the
description that follows it should be remembered that odd indexed moves are made by the
Challenger and even indexed moves by the Defender.
µk = COUNTER(y). Let σk−1 = 〈Tk−1, vk−1,∆k−1,Γk−1,Pk−1,Qk−1〉. If k is odd, µk
is made by C, and COUNTER(y) can be applied only if 〈y, vk−1〉 ∈A and y ∈ Γk−1, i.e., y
attacks the current argument (vk−1) and is available. The new state, σk , is now
2 The terminology we use is not employed in [38] which is given simply in terms of attacking moves and
back-tracking.
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Tk := Tk−1 + 〈y, vk−1〉,
vk := y,
∆k :=∆k−1,
Γk := Γk−1/{y},
Pk := Pk−1,
Qk :=Qk−1.
If k is even, so that µk is made by D, then COUNTER(y) can be applied only if: y ∈∆k−1;
〈y, vk−1〉 ∈A; and for each set R in Qk−1, R is not contained in Pk−1 ∪ {y}, i.e., D has
available an argument y with which to attack vk−1 and, if y is added to the set of arguments
that D is (currently) committed to then the resulting set has not been ruled inadmissible
earlier.
The new state, σk is now
Tk := Tk−1 + 〈y, vk−1〉,
vk := y,
∆k :=∆k−1/
({y} ∪ {z ∈∆k−1: 〈y, z〉 ∈A or 〈z, y〉 ∈A}),
Γk := Γk−1/
({y} ∪ range(y)),
Pk := Pk−1 ∪ {y},
Qk :=Qk−1.
The definition of ∆k from ∆k−1 and y captures the fact that D (in attempting to form an
admissible set) may not violate the requirement to be conflict free. The form taken by Γk
indicates that in adding y to its (currently) accepted arguments, D now has a defence to all
arguments in Γk−1 that y attacks. It follows that there is no gain in these being available
to C.
µk = BACKUP(j, y) (where j is even and 0  j  k − 3). The BACKUP move is only
invoked by C and corresponds to the situation where C has no available attack with which
to continue the current dispute line. The BACKUP move returns the dispute to the most
recent point (σj ) from which C can mount a fresh attack. Thus, if the (currently open)
dispute line is,
Lk−1 = 〈vk−1 → vk−2 → ·· ·→ vj+1 → vj → ·· ·→ v2 → v1 → v0〉
then
BC1. Lk−1 is a closed failing attack, i.e., there are no arguments z ∈ Γk−1 for which
〈z, vk−1〉 ∈A.
BC2. For each r in the set {j + 2, j + 4, j + 6, . . . , k − 3} there are no arguments
z ∈ Γr/
({vr , vr+1, vr+2, . . . , vk−2} ∪ range({vr , vr+2, . . . , vk−3}))
for which 〈z, vr 〉 ∈A.
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BC3. The parameters j and y specified in the move BACKUP(j, y) are such thaty ∈ Γj/
({vj , vj+1, vj+2, . . . , vk−2} ∪ range({vj , vj+2, . . . , vk−3}))
and 〈y, vj 〉 ∈A.
In summary, the conditions for the move BACKUP(j, y) to be applicable are: C cannot
continue the current dispute line since there is no argument in C’s arsenal that can be used
to attack the last argument proposed by D (BC1); C cannot mount a new line of attack on
any argument put forward by D in the set {vj+2, vj+4, . . . , vk−3} (BC2); C, by using y ,
can launch a different attack on vj (BC3).
The new state σk effected by the move BACKUP(j, y) is given by:
Tk := Tk−1 + 〈y, vj 〉,
vk := y,
∆k :=∆k−1,
Γk := Γj/
({y, vj+1, vj+2, . . . , vk−1} ∪ range({vj+2, vj+4, . . . , vk−1})),
Pk := Pk−1,
Qk :=Qk−1.
Note that ∆k does not revert to its content at the ‘backup’ position ∆j : D has ‘committed’
to defending these in order to force C to adopt a new line of dispute. Secondly, the set, Γk ,
of available arguments for C, has all of the arguments advanced in progressing from vj+1
to vk−3 removed (rather than simply the ‘old’ attack vj+1 and the ‘new’ attack y on vj ):
since D has already established a suitable line of defence to each of these, their only utility
to the challenger would be in prolonging a dispute, rather than winning it.
µk = RETRACT. The RETRACT move is only made by D. Suppose
σk−1 = 〈Tk−1, vk−1,∆k−1,Γk−1,Pk−1,Qk−1〉
is the current state (so that k − 1 is odd). For RETRACT to be applicable D must have no
available attack on vk−1 and Pk−1 = {x}. In this case, the Challenger has succeeded in
showing that the set Pk−1 cannot be extended to form an admissible set. Thus the only
option available to the Defender is to try constructing a new admissible set containing x .
Formally, the next state σk is given as
Tk := 〈x〉,
vk := x,
∆k :=∆0,
Γk := Γ0,
Pk := P0,
Qk :=Qk−1 ∪ {Pk−1}.
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1.2.3. Discussion
The main point that should be noted is the asymmetry concerning BACKUP and
RETRACT. Firstly, BACKUP may be seen as the Challenger invoking a new line of attack
within the same dispute tree. On the other hand, RETRACT represents the dispute over x
being started again, this time, however, with the knowledge that some lines of defence are
not available, i.e., those that would result in a ‘known’ inadmissible set being constructed.
Of course, as will be shown later, if x is credulously accepted then D, employing ‘best
play’ will never need to make a retraction. In defining the game rules, however, we cannot
assume that D will play ‘intelligently’ and thus may, inadvertently, call upon arguments
that are eventually exposed as collectively indefensible. It may be observed that the position
from which the dispute is resumed (following a retraction) is the opening dispute tree:
while, in principle, one could define the next dispute tree to result from some variant of the
current one, such an approach affords no significant gain.
1.2.4. Credulous and sceptical games
Definition 4. Let M〈H,x〉 = 〈µ1,µ2, . . . ,µk〉 be a terminated TPI-dispute over an argument
x in the argument system H. M〈H,x〉 is a successful (credulous) defence of x if k is even,
and a successful rebuttal of x if k is odd.
The following result reformulates Proposition 1 of [38] in terms of the formal
framework introduced above.
Theorem 1. CA(H, x)⇔ (∃M〈H,x〉: M〈H,x〉 is a successful defence of x).
Proof. First suppose that CA(H(〈X ,A〉, x) holds, i.e., that x is credulously accepted in
H. Consider any admissible set, Sx , of H containing x . It is certainly the case that using
only the arguments in Sx , D can always COUNTER attacks available to C (recall that in
replying to COUNTER(y) from C the response COUNTER(z) will remove from C’s arsenal
of attacks any argument attacked by z). Furthermore, D never has to invoke the RETRACT
move. It follows that such a dispute will eventually terminate with C having no further
move, i.e., as a successful defence of x .
Conversely, suppose that M〈H,x〉 is a successful defence of x . Consider the set Pk
pertaining after µk the final move of the dispute. It is certainly the case that x ∈ Pk (since
this holds throughout the dispute). In addition, Pk is conflict-free (since ∆j never makes
available to D, arguments that conflict with those in Pj ). Finally, since C has no move
available, every attack on arguments y ∈ Pk must have been countered, i.e., is defended
by some p ∈ Pk . The three properties just identified establish that Pk is an admissible set
containing x , hence x is credulously accepted. ✷
Theorem 2. For all TPI-dispute instances, 〈H, x〉 either all terminated M〈H,x〉 are
successful defences of x or all are successful rebuttals.
Proof. Suppose the contrary and
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M(1) = 〈µ11,µ12, . . . ,µ1m〉 with σ 1m = 〈T 1m,v1m,∆1m,Γ 1m,P 1m,Q1m〉,
M(2) = 〈µ21,µ22, . . . ,µ2n〉 with σ 2n = 〈T 2n , v2n,∆2n,Γ 2n ,P 2n ,Q2n〉
are different TPI-disputes with M(1) a successful defence of x and M(2) a successful
rebuttal of x within H. Since M(1) is a successful defence, the subset P 1m is an admissible
set (containing x). If M(2) is a successful rebuttal of x , then D must reach the point
where no RETRACT move is applicable. Consider the admissible set, P 1m found by M(1)
and the first move t at which some Q ⊆ P 1m is added to Q2t−1. It must be the case that
µ2t = RETRACT (or t = n+ 1) and that D has no available defence with which to counter
v2t−1. Now we derive a contradiction: v2t−1 attacks y ∈ P 2t−2 =Q⊆ P 1m and the progress of
M(2) has left no counter attack on v2t−1 available to D. On the other hand, such a defence
(z, say) is present in P 1m since it is an admissible set and z would only be unavailable if
it attacked or was attacked by Q, contradicting the fact that P 1m (of which Q is a subset)
must be conflict-free. ✷
Definition 5. For an argument system H(〈X ,A〉) and x ∈ X , the x-augmented system, Hx
is the system formed by adding a new argument {xa} to X together with attack {〈x, xa〉}.
The following reformulates Proposition 2 of [38].
Theorem 3. Let H be an argument system in which every preferred extension is also a
stable extension and let x be an argument in H.3 The argument x is sceptically accepted
in H if and only if, there is a dispute, M , providing a successful rebuttal of xa in the
x-augmented system Hx .
Proof. Let H be an argument system in which every preferred extension is stable. First
suppose that x is sceptically accepted in H, the first part of the theorem will follow (via
Theorem 1) by showing that xa is not credulously accepted in the x-augmented system.
Suppose the contrary and that Sa ⊂X ∪{xa} is a preferred extension inHx that contains xa .
The set Sa cannot contain x , and must contain at least one attacker of x . The set, Sa/{xa},
however, is an admissible set in H and cannot be developed to a preferred extension
containing x . This contradicts the premise that x is sceptically accepted in H.
Conversely, suppose that xa is not credulously accepted in the x-augmented systemHx .
Consider any preferred extension S of H. Suppose x /∈ S. Since S is a stable extension,
there is some attacker, y , of x , in S and since y attacks x which is the only attack on xa in
the x-augmented system, we deduce that S ∪ {xa} would form a preferred extension in Hx
contradicting the premise that xa is not credulously accepted. ✷
The example in Fig. 1 is adapted from [38], and shows that the stability condition is
needed. In this example of an x-augmented system, xa is not in any preferred extension
since there is no defence to the attack by x (y is inadmissible since it is effectively self-
attacking). Within the original system, however, x is not sceptically accepted: there are
3 Argument systems satisfying this condition are termed coherent in [17, Definition 31(1), p. 332].
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two preferred extensions—{x, z} and {u}—the latter containing neither x nor its attacker
y . We note that testing if an argument system is coherent, i.e., every preferred extension
is also stable, is likely to be difficult: Dunne and Bench-Capon [19] having demonstrated
this to be $p2 -complete, although there is an efficiently decidable property that guarantees
coherence.
2. Examples
In order to clarify how particular disputes develop we give two examples based on the
argument systems, shown in Fig. 2. It may be observed that the system in Fig. 2(b) can be
interpreted as a representation of the tautology,
¬F(y, z)=¬((y ∨ z)∧ (y ∨¬z)∧ (¬y ∨ z)∧ (¬y ∨¬z)) (1)
and so serves to illustrate dispute progression for proving credulous acceptance of the
argument ¬F and sceptical acceptance of the same argument, i.e., that the argument F
in this system is not credulously accepted. A general translation from CNF formulae to
argument systems will be given in Definition 7.
For Fig. 2(a) one possible TPI-dispute over x (in which we abbreviate COUNTER,
BACKUP, and RETRACT to C,B,R) is,
k µk vk ∆k Γk Pk Qk
0 – x {u,v,w} {y, z,u, v,w} {x} ∅
1 C(y) y {u,v,w} {z,u, v,w} {x} ∅
2 C(v) v {u} {z,u} {x, v} ∅
3 B(0, z) z {u} {u} {x, v} ∅
4 R x {u,v,w} {y, z,u, v,w} {x} {x, v}
5 C(y) y {u,v,w} {z,u, v,w} {x} {x, v}
6 C(u) u {v,w} {z, v,w} {x,u} {x, v}
7 B(4, z) z {v,w} {v,w} {x,u} {x, v}
8 C(w) w ∅ ∅ {x,u,w} {x, v}
(2)
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It may be observed that D, at µ2, makes an ‘incorrect’ move in attacking y using v (instead
of u) thus removing w from the set of available arguments and allowing C to force a
retraction by attacking x with z. Of course, D could have shortened the length of the
dispute by playing COUNTER(u) as the second move. As we noted earlier, the intention is
to define the protocol for disputes in such a way that even if D advances what turn out to
be ill-advised counter-attacks, this does not result in the game being lost since there are
opportunities to correct. For Fig. 2(a) there are exactly three possible TPI-disputes over x:
two in which C first counter-attacks with y , and one in which the initial counter-attack is
using z.
As a final illustration we give an example of a dispute establishing sceptical acceptance
of −F in the system of Fig. 2(b). It is not difficult to see that this follows by showing that
F is not credulously accepted, so the description is given in terms of a successful rebuttal
of F ;
k µk vk Pk Qk
0 – F {F } ∅
1 C(C1) C1 {F } ∅
2 C(y) y {F,y} ∅
3 B(0,C3) C3 {F,y} ∅
4 C(z) z {F,y, z} ∅
5 B(0,C4) C4 {F,y, z} ∅
6 R F {F } {{F,y, z}}
7 C(C1) C1 {F } {{F,y, z}} (3)
8 C(z) z {F,z} {{F,y, z}}
9 B(6,C2) C2 {F,z} {{F,y, z}}
10 R F {F } {{F,y, z}, {F,z}}
11 C(C1) C1 {F } {{F,y, z}, {F,z}}
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12 C(y) y {F,y} {{F,y, z}, {F,z}}
13 B(10,C3) C3 {F,y} {{F,y, z}, {F,z}}
14 R F {F } {{F,y, z}, {F,z}, {F,y}}
15 C(C1) C1 {F } {{F,y, z}, {F,z}, {F,y}}
and now, D cannot counter-attack C1 without constructing an already shown to be
inadmissible set nor RETRACT since P15 = {F }.
3. Complexity of argument games
The preceding sections have largely been concerned with a rigorous formulation of the
concept of TPI-dispute as first outlined in [38]. The principal aim of the present paper,
however, is to consider the following questions.
Question 1. Given a TPI-dispute instance—〈H, x〉—such that x is credulously accepted in
H, how many moves are required (in the worst case) in a dispute M defining a successful
defence of x?
Question 2. Given a TPI-dispute instance—〈H, x〉—such that x is not credulously
accepted in H, how many moves are necessary (in the best case) for a dispute M
establishing a successful rebuttal of x?
In view of Theorem 3, Question 2, is of interest with respect to the number of moves
required to establish sceptical acceptance of an argument.
In order to make these precise, we introduce the idea of Dispute Complexity. Given an
instance of a TPI-dispute, 〈H, x〉, its dispute complexity, denoted δ(H, x) is,
δ(H, x)= min
M: M is a terminated dispute over x in H
|M|.
Question 1 turns out to have a relatively straightforward characterisation using the
following idea.
Definition 6. Let H(〈X ,A〉) be an argument system and x ∈ X an argument that is
credulously accepted in H. The rank of x in H, denoted ρ(H, x), is defined by
min
S⊆X /{x}: S∪{x} is admissible in H
|S|.
Theorem 4. For any TPI-dispute instance—〈H, x〉—in which x is credulously accepted
in H,
δ(H, x)= 2ρ(H, x).
Proof. To see that δ(H, x) 2ρ(H, x), consider the subset S of X that attains the value
ρ(H, x). By an argument similar to that in the proof of Theorem 1, x can be defended
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in a TPI-dispute, with D employing only arguments in S. Adopting such a strategy,
D never needs to invoke the RETRACT move. The size of the set, P , to which D is
committed increases by one with each move made by D as more members of S are
added. It follows that, since S is admissible, the Challenger will have no further moves
open once D has committed to every argument in S. To complete the proof we show
that δ(H, x) 2ρ(H, x). Consider a TPI-dispute, M , that attains δ(H, x) and the dispute
tree, T|M| that is active when the Challenger admits defeat. Certainly, |M| must be at
least twice the number of arguments in T|M| (excluding x). The arguments to which D is
committed after the |M|th move must define an admissible set (otherwise C could continue
the dispute by finding an appropriate y attacking some member of P|M|). It follows that
|P|M|/{x}| ρ(H, x) and thence δ(H, x) 2ρ(H, x) as required. ✷
Theorem 4, in its characterisation of the answer to our first question, can be interpreted
in the following way: if an argument x is credulously accepted in the system H then
there is a ‘short proof’ of this, i.e., using the TPI-dispute that achieves δ(H, x) moves.
It is important to note that this does not imply that deciding if such a proof exists can be
accomplished efficiently: given the results of [16]4 (from which it may be deduced that CA
is NP-complete) it seems unlikely that such a decision method could be found.
For the remainder of this paper we are concerned with the second question raised. As
with the view proposed in the preceding paragraph, we can interpret results concerning this
question in terms of properties of the ‘size’ of ‘proofs’ that an argument is not credulously
accepted. The decision problem CA being NP-complete, indicates that such proofs are
concerned with a CO-NP-complete problem. While all NP-complete problems are such that
positive instances of these have concise proofs that they are positive instances (this being
one of the defining characteristics of the class NP as a whole) it is suspected that no CO-NP-
complete problem has this property. In other words, we have the following (long-standing)
conjecture: if L is a CO-NP-complete problem, then there are (infinitely many) instances,
x of L, for which L(x) is true but the ‘shortest proof’ of this is of length superpolynomial
in the number of bits needed to encode x .5
The discussion above suggests that (assuming NP = CO-NP) there must be infinitely
many instances 〈H, x〉 for which x is not credulously accepted in H and for which
δ(H, x)—the dispute complexity of the instance—is superpolynomial in |X |, the number
of arguments in the system.
Our goal in the remainder of this paper is to establish the existence of a sequence of
TPI-dispute instances—〈HN,x〉—havingN arguments, x not credulously accepted inHN ,
and with the number of moves in any terminated TPI-dispute being exponential in N . Of
course, since these bounds apply only to our specific formalisation, this raises the question
of defining ‘more powerful’ dispute protocols.
4 Dimopoulos and Torres [16] employ rather different terminology from that introduced by Dung [17],
however, it is not difficult to relate the two: a brief discussion interpreting the contribution of [16] in terms of
Dung’s argument systems is presented in [19].
5 In complexity-theoretic terms, this is the assertion that NP = CO-NP. It is worth noting that if true, it implies
P = NP. The converse, however, is not (necessarily) true: in principle one might have NP = CO-NP and P = NP.
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3.1. Propositional tautologies and argument systemsThe proof that CA is NP-complete obtained in [16] is effected through a reduction from
3-SAT, this construction extending easily to CNF-SAT, i.e., without the restriction of three
literals per clause. The class of argument systems that result via this translation of CNF
formulae turn out to be central to the analysis of dispute complexity, we therefore review
the details of this in,
Definition 7. Given,
ϕ(Zn)=
m∧
i=1
Ci =
m∧
i=1
(
ki∨
j=1
yi,j
)
a propositional formula in CNF comprising m clauses—Ci—the ith containing exactly
ki  1 distinct literals over the propositional variables Zn = 〈z1, z2, . . . , zn〉, the argument
system Hϕ(〈Xϕ,Aϕ〉) has 2n+m+ 1 arguments
Xϕ = {ϕ} ∪ {C1,C2, . . . ,Cm} ∪ {z1,¬z1, z2,¬z2, . . . , zn,¬zn}
and attack relationshipAϕ in which,
(1) ∀Ci 〈Ci,ϕ〉 ∈Aϕ .
(2) ∀zj 〈zj ,¬zj 〉 ∈Aϕ and 〈¬zj , zj 〉 ∈Aϕ .
(3) 〈zj ,Ci〉 ∈Aϕ if zj is a literal in the clause Ci .
(4) 〈¬zj ,Ci〉 ∈Aϕ if ¬zj is a literal in the clause Ci .
For convenience we will subsequently write y ∈C rather than ‘y is a literal in the clauseC’.
This system is similar (although not identical) to the mechanism defined in [16,
Theorem 5.1, p. 227]. It is straightforward to show as a consequence,
Fact 1. The CNF formula ϕ(Zn) is satisfiable if and only if the argument ϕ is credulously
accepted in the system Hϕ(〈Xϕ,Aϕ〉).
Thus in attempting to derive lower bounds on dispute complexity for cases in which x
is not credulously accepted in H, we could focus on bounding δ(Hϕ,ϕ) for appropriate
instances in which ¬ϕ(Zn) is a tautology, i.e., ϕ(Zn) is not satisfiable.
Our approach to establishing such lower bounds will be rather less direct than that of
examining δ(Hϕ,ϕ) for a specific propositional tautology ¬ϕ. Instead, we shall show that
the progression of a TPI-dispute over ϕ can be ‘efficiently simulated’ within a specific
Proof Calculus for Propositional Logic: since the calculus we employ is known to require
exponentially long proofs to validate certain tautologies, it will then follow that δ(Hϕ,ϕ)
for such ϕ must also be exponential (in the number of arguments defining Hϕ).
It is worth noting, at this point, that there is a rich corpus of research concerning the
length of proofs in various proof systems. Results on the complexity of General Resolution
date back to the seminal paper of Haken [23] in which this approach was shown to require
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exponential length proofs for tautologies corresponding to the combinatorial Pigeon-Hole
Principle, with important subsequent work in, e.g., [1,3,4,30], etc. Excellent introductory
surveys discussing progress involving proof complexity may be found in the articles by
Pudlák [31] and Beame and Pitassi [5].
3.2. The Gentzen Calculus for Propositional Logic
The Proof Calculus around which our simulation is built is the Gentzen (or Sequent)
Calculus, [21], with, however, one of its standard inference rules being unavailable.
In its most general (propositional) form, the Gentzen Calculus, prescribes rules for
deriving sequents—Γ ⇒∆—where Γ , ∆ are sets of propositional formulae (over a set of
atomic propositional variables {x1, x2, x3, . . .}) built using some finite (complete) logical
basis. A proof of the sequent Γ ⇒ ∆, consists of a sequence of derivation steps each
of which is either an axiom or follows by applying one of the rules to (at most) two
previously derived sequents. In what follows we observe the convention of employing
upper case Roman letters—{A,B,C, . . . , }—to denote propositional formulae, and upper
case Greek letters—{Γ,∆, . . .}—to denote sets of such formulae. We use Γ,A to denote
the set Γ ∪ {A}.
Definition 8 (Gentzen Calculus for Propositional Formulae). Let L be the language of
well-formed formulae using the basis {∧,∨,¬} and propositional variables drawn from
{z1, z2, z3, . . .}.
A sequent is an expression the form Γ ⇒ ∆ where Γ , ∆ are (finite) subsets of L,
i.e., sets of well-formed formulae. For a sequent S = Γ ⇒∆ we use LHS(S) to denote Γ
and, similarly, RHS(S) to denote ∆. A Gentzen System is defined by a set GS of axioms
and inference rules. A sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is provable in the Gentzen System GS (written
GS Γ ⇒∆), if there is a finite sequence of sequents,
S1, S2, . . . , Sk−1, Sk, Sk+1, . . . , St
for which St is the sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ and for all k (1  k  t), the sequent Sk is either an
axiom of GS or there are sequents Si , Sj (with i, j < k) and an inference rule r of GS
such that Sk may be inferred from Si and Sj as a consequence of the rule r . The Proof
Complexity of a sequent S in the Gentzen System GS (denoted π(S,GS) is defined for
provable sequents, to be the least t such that S is derived by a sequence of t sequents.6
We shall use a modification of the Gentzen system, G shown in Table 1, wherein A and
B are members of L, and Γ , ∆, etc. subsets of L.
It may be observed that the Resolution Rule is, in fact, a special case of the CUT rule: if
we consider clauses
P = x ∨
r∨
i=1
yi; Q=¬x ∨
s∨
i=1
zi
6 We note that some authors choose to define proof complexity in terms of the total number of symbol
occurrences over the derivation. For the class of propositional formulae we will be considering, the two measures
are polynomially equivalent.
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Table 1
The Gentzen system G
Axioms
{A} ⇒ {A}
Rules
(θ ⇒) Γ ⇒∆ Γ ⇒∆ (⇒ θ)
Γ,A⇒∆ Γ ⇒∆,A
(CUT) Γ ⇒∆,A ; Γ ′,A⇒∆′
Γ ∪ Γ ′ ⇒∆∪∆′
(¬⇒) Γ ⇒∆,A Γ,A⇒∆ (⇒¬)
Γ,¬A⇒∆ Γ ⇒∆,¬A
(∨⇒) Γ,A⇒∆ ; Γ ′,B⇒∆′ Γ ⇒∆,A,B (⇒∨)
Γ ∪ Γ ′,A∨B⇒∆∪∆′ Γ ⇒∆,A∨B
these are resolved (on x) to the clause
r∨
i=1
yi ∨
s∨
j=1
zj .
The clause P may be expressed as the sequent, {y1, . . . , yr} ⇒ {¬x} and Q as {¬x} ⇒
{¬z1, . . . ,¬zs} whence the sequent {y1, . . . , yr} ⇒ {¬z1, . . . ,¬zs} follows from the CUT
rule. For a more detailed comparison of General Resolution and Gentzen calculi the reader
is referred to [2].
The Gentzen system that we will be considering is G/CUT, i.e., that which allows all
of the rules of the system G except for the CUT rule. We recall some standard results
concerning the systems G and G/CUT.
Fact 2 (Gentzen [21]). The propositional formula F ∈ L is a tautology if and only if
G ∅⇒ {F}.
Fact 3 (The Gentzen Cut-Elimination Theorem [21]).
G ∅⇒ {F} if and only if G/CUT ∅⇒ {F}.
Fact 3 establishes that the CUT rule is not needed in order to derive any provable sequent.
Nonetheless, CUT turns out to be an extremely powerful operation:
Fact 4 (Urquhart [35,36]). There are (infinite) sequences of formulae 〈Fn〉 in L for which:
(a) Fn is a propositional tautology of n propositional variables.
(b) π(∅⇒ {Fn},G)=O(nk) (for k ∈N).
(c) π(∅⇒ {Fn},G/CUT)=/(2nε ) (where ε > 0).
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These constructions by Urquhart are explicit, i.e., a specific sequence 〈Fn〉 is proved to
have the properties stated in Fact 4.
We now state and prove the main theorem of this paper.
Theorem 5. Let
ϕ(Zn)=
m∧
i=1
Ci =
m∧
i=1
(
ki∨
j=1
yi,j
)
be any unsatisfiable CNF-formula,Hϕ be the argument system defined from ϕ(Zn) as given
in Definition 7, and Sϕ the ( provable) sequent,
∅ ⇒
m⋃
i=1
{
¬
(
ki∨
j=1
yi,j
)}
.
Then,
π
(
Sϕ,G/CUT
)
 δ(Hϕ,ϕ)+ 2n+m. (4)
Less formally, Theorem 5 states that the length of the shortest proof of ¬ϕ (ϕ being
in CNF) being a tautology within the CUT-free Gentzen system cannot be ‘much greater
than’ the number of moves needed to form a successful rebuttal of ϕ in the argument
system Hϕ .
Proof of Theorem 5. Let, ϕ,Hϕ , and Sϕ be as described in the Theorem statement. Given
any terminated TPI-dispute, M over ϕ in Hϕ we describe how its progress may simulated
in the Gentzen system G/CUT. We first observe two important properties of the dis-
pute M .
Firstly, M may be encoded as a sequence of ordered sets, Ri , (for which the term
retraction round will subsequently be employed). Each of these takes the form
Ri = 〈D1, y1,D2, y2, . . . ,Dj , yj , . . . ,Dq, yq,Fi〉, (5)
where
{D1,D2, . . . ,Dq,Fi} ⊆ {C1,C2, . . . ,Cm}, yj ∈Dj, yj /∈ Fi ∀1 j  q.
In other words, Ri describes the alternation between clauses (D) used to attack ϕ and
counterattacks (y) used to repel these attacks. The final attack by the clause Fi is the
position at which the retraction of {ϕ,y1, y2, . . . , yq} is forced. We observe that |R1| is the
number of moves made in M prior to the first RETRACT move; and in general, |Ri | is the
number of moves between the retraction arising from Ri−1 and the next such in M .
In the final move of M , the corresponding set R, contains just a single clause: i.e., that
clause of ϕ upon which the Defender, by reason of the totality of earlier retractions, can
mount no attack.
The second property of interest concerns the relationship between the literals defining
a retraction forcing clause, F , and those used to defend against attacks on ϕ within the
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current dispute tree, i.e., the literals {y1, y2, . . . , yq}. The literals in F may be partitioned
into two sets,
W = {w1,w2, . . . ,wr}; U = {u1, u2, . . . , us} (6)
wherein the literals in W cannot be used to attack F since for each w ∈ W , ¬w ∈
{y1, y2, . . . , yq} and those in U are unavailable since for each u ∈ U , there is some subset
V of {y1, y2, . . . , yq} such that the Defender has retracted {ϕ,V,u} in an earlier move.
With the two observations above, the idea underlying the proof may be described,
informally, as efficiently deriving sequents that simulate the reasoning through which
retractions are forced. More precisely, given
〈R1,R2, . . . ,Ri, . . . ,Rt 〉
the sequence of retraction rounds describing the dispute M , we construct a mapping
β : {1,2, . . . , t}→N and sequents
〈S1, S2, S3, . . . , Sp〉
for which
β(i + 1) > β(i) 1 (1 i < t)
β(t) p  β(t)+m
and
Sp = Sϕ = ∅ ⇒
m⋃
i=1
{
¬
(
ki∨
j=1
yi,j
)}
.
In general, the sequent Sβ(i) will express the fact that the Defender must retract the set
{ϕ,y1, y2, . . . , yq} in the ith round, since this leaves no defence available to an attack by
the clause Fi on ϕ.
To avoid a surfeit of subscripts, we use Yi to denote the set {y1, y2, . . . , yq} of literals
defining Ri , with Wi and Ui being the partition of the retraction forcing clause, Fi , as
described in (6) (obviously the exact number of literals in each of these will be dependent
on which retraction round Ri is relevant).
When Ui = ∅, for each u ∈ Ui , ret(u,Yi) is a minimal (with respect to ⊆) subset of
Yi for which the set of arguments {ϕ,u, ret(u,Yi)} has been the subject of an earlier
retraction.7 Finally, index(u,Yi) is,
index(u,Yi)=max
{
k  β(i − 1): LHS(Sk)= ret(u,Yi) ∪ {u}
}
. (7)
Note. That index(u,Yi) is well-defined will be clear from the remainder of the proof.
The theorem will follow from the claim below.
7 An indefinite article is required here, since there may be more than one such subset, e.g., {ϕ,y1, u} and
{ϕ,y2, u} could both have been retracted: the subsequent argument will show that in such cases, ret(u,Y ) can be
chosen to be either {y1} or {y2}.
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Claim 1. Given 〈R1, . . . ,Rt 〉 the sequence of retraction rounds defined by M , there is a
mapping β : {1,2, . . . , t} →N, with the following properties: β(i + 1) > β(i) > 1; and, if
the sequent, Sβ(i) is defined to be
Sβ(i) = {Yi}⇒ {¬Fi} ∪
⋃
u∈Ui
RHS(Sindex(u,Yi)),
then
(a) Sβ(i) is well-defined, i.e., index(u,Yi) is defined for each u ∈ Ui .
(b) Sβ(i) is provable in G/CUT with π(Sβ(i),G/CUT) β(i).
Proof. First note that we may use the following derivations as the first 2n lines, prior to
establishing Sβ(1). In consequence, β(1) > 2n.
Sequent via Line
{zj }⇒ {zj } Axiom 2j − 1
{zj ,¬zj }⇒ ∅ (¬⇒) and 2j − 1 2j
We complete the proof of the claim by induction on i  1. The inductive base, i = 1, deals
with the retraction enforced by R1, i.e., we need to show that the sequent
Sβ(1) = {Y1}⇒ {¬F1}
is derivable. Noting that R1 represents the first occurrence of a RETRACT move by the
Defender, the set U1 must be empty, i.e., the retraction is forced because each literal that
could be used to attack F1 is unavailable by reason of Y1 containing its negation. It follows
that,
F1 =W1 = {w1,w2, . . . ,wr },
Y1 = {¬w1,¬w2, . . . ,¬wr, yr+1, yr+2, . . . , yq}.
Let Tk (for 1 k  r) be the sequent,
{¬w1,¬w2, . . . ,¬wk},Ak ⇒∅ where Ak =
k∨
j=1
wj .
For k = 1, the sequent T1 = {w1,¬w1} ⇒ ∅ has already been derived. For k > 1, Tk is
derived in one step from the sequent {wk,¬wk} ⇒ ∅ and Tk−1 by a single application of
the rule (∨⇒). We deduce that,
{¬w1,¬w2, . . . ,¬wk},F1 ⇒∅
is derived in k − 1 steps, and the required sequent—Sβ(1)—by a single application of
(⇒¬) to Tr followed by q − r applications of (θ ⇒) in order to construct
{¬w1, . . . ,¬wr, yr+1, . . . , yq}⇒ {¬F1}.
This gives the value of β(1) as 2n+ q , where we note that µ2q+2 is the first RETRACT
move occurring in M .
For the Inductive Step, we assume for all retraction rounds Rj with 1 j < i that the
following hold:
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(IH1) The value of β(j) has been defined.
(IH2) The sequent,
Sβ(j) = {Yj }⇒ {¬Fj } ∪
⋃
u∈Uj
RHS(Sindex(u,Yj ))
has been derived in G/CUT after β(j) steps.
To complete the inductive proof of Claim 1, we ‘simulate’ the retraction round Ri and to
this end it is necessary to,
(C1) define a value of β(i) which is greater than β(i − 1), and
(C2) show that the sequent,
{Yi}⇒ {¬Fi} ∪
⋃
u∈Ui
RHS(Sindex(u,Yi))
is well-defined and derivable in a further β(i)− β(i − 1) steps.
Consider the retraction forcing clause, Fi = {Wi,Ui}, so that
Yi = {¬w1,¬w2, . . . ,¬wr, yr+1, yr+2, . . . , yq}.
If Ui = ∅, then with β(i)= β(i − 1)+ q , the sequent,
Sβ(i) = {Yi}⇒ {¬Fi}
is derivable in a further q steps using exactly the same approach as employed in the
Inductive Base. Thus we may assume that Ui is non-empty with
Ui = {u1, u2, . . . , us}.
Recalling that 〈Wi,Ui〉 is a partition of Fi it is certainly the case that neither ¬u ∈ Yi nor
u ∈ Yi (the latter holding since Fi was available to the Challenger with which to attack ϕ).
This being so and u being unavailable to the Defender to attack Fi it follows that there
has been a retraction round in which some subset of Yi together with u (and ϕ) have been
retracted. Therefore, some such subset of Yi must satisfy the criteria defining ret(u,Yi)
with respect to u. Suppose Rj is the round at which a committment to {ϕ,u, ret(u,Yi)}
was retracted by the Defender. Clearly, j < i and hence from the Inductive Hypothesis, the
sequent, Sβ(j), with,
Sβ(j) =
{
u, ret(u,Yi)
}⇒∆ where ∅ ⊂∆⊆ {¬C1, . . . ,¬Cm}
has been derived. As a result we deduce that for each u ∈ Ui , the value index(u,Yi) is
defined and does not exceed β(i − 1). In summary, we have proven (via the Inductive
Hypothesis) the existence of s = |Ui | sequents,
〈Si,1, Si,2, . . . , Si,s 〉
for which
LHS(Si,k)= ret(uk,Yi)∪ {uk} and RHS(Si,k)⊆ {¬C1,¬C2, . . . ,¬Cm}.
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We can now complete the derivation of the required sequent Sβ(i).
From s − 1 applications of (∨⇒) using Si,1, Si,2, . . . , Si,s we obtain
Sβ(i−1)+s−1 =
{
s⋃
k=1
ret(uk,Yi)
}
,
s∨
k=1
uk ⇒
{
s⋃
k=1
RHS(Si,k)
}
.
A further r applications of (∨⇒) involving Sβ(i−1)+s−1 and the sequents
{wk,¬wk}⇒ ∅
yields Sβ(i−1)+r+s−1 as{
s⋃
k=1
ret(uk,Yi)
}
∪
{
r⋃
k=1
¬wk
}
,
s∨
k=1
uk ∨
r∨
k=1
wk ⇒
{
s⋃
k=1
RHS(Si,k)
}
.
Recalling that,
Fi =
(
s∨
k=1
uk ∨
r∨
k=1
wk
)
a single application of (⇒¬) to Sβ(i−1)+r+s−1 gives Sβ(i−1)+r+s as,{
s⋃
k=1
ret(uk,Yi)
}
∪
{
r⋃
k=1
¬wk
}
⇒
{
s⋃
k=1
RHS(Si,k)
}
, ¬Fi.
Finally, since it may be the case that{
s⋃
k=1
ret(uk,Yi)
}
∪
{
r⋃
k=1
¬wk
}
⊂ Yi
(i.e., a strict subset of Yi ) a total of,∣∣∣∣∣Yi
/{ s⋃
k=1
ret(uk,Yi)∪
r⋃
k=1
¬wk
}∣∣∣∣∣
applications of (θ ⇒) will give Sβ(i) as,
Sβ(i) = {Yi}⇒ {¬Fi} ∪
⋃
u∈Ui
RHS(Sindex(u,Yi)),
where
β(i − 1)+ r + s  β(i) β(i − 1)+ r + s + q  β(i − 1)+ 2q.
Note that 2q = |Ri |−1 is the total number of moves occurring in M between the retraction
round Ri−1 and Ri . This completes the inductive proof of the claim. ✷
To complete the proof of the theorem we need only observe that the total number of
steps required to derive Sϕ is bounded above by β(t)+m.
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(The additional m arises from the possibility that Sβ(t) may be of the form ∅⇒∆ with
∆ a (non-empty) strict subset of
{¬C1,¬C2, . . . ,¬Cm}.
This could occur if some subset ψ of ϕ’s clauses defined an unsatisfiable CNF-formula.
In such cases Sβ(t) would not be identical to the sequent Sϕ of the theorem statement,
however, at most m applications of (⇒ θ) (adding the ‘missing’ ¬Ci clauses) will suffice
to derive Sϕ from Sβ(t).)
From the analysis in the proof of the claim it is clear that the values β(i) satisfy:
β(i) β(i − 1)+ |Ri | when 1< i  t,
β(1) 2n+ |R1|,
hence β(t) 2n+∑ti=1 |Ri | 2n+ |M|.
Thus from any terminated TPI-dispute, M , over the unsatisfiable CNF-formula ϕ in the
argument system Hϕ we may construct a proof in G/CUT that ¬ϕ is a tautology, i.e., of
the sequent Sϕ . Since this proof involves at most |M| + 2n+m steps we conclude that
π(Sϕ,G/CUT) δ(Hϕ,ϕ)+ 2n+m
as required. ✷
From Theorem 5 we get,
Corollary 1. There are (infinite) sequences of argument systems with arguments x ∈ X not
credulously accepted but with the number of moves in any TPI-dispute establishing such
exponential in |X |.
To conclude this section, we illustrate how the example of Fig. 2(b) that resulted in the
dispute given in (3) translates into a derivation of the required sequent following the proof
in Theorem 5.
3.3. Example
Recall that Fig. 2(b) could be interpreted as the tautology
¬F(y, z)=¬((y ∨ z)∧ (y ∨¬z)∧ (¬y ∨ z)∧ (¬y ∨¬z)). (8)
From (3) using the encoding of retraction rounds described in the proof of Theorem 5
R1 =
〈
(y ∨ z), y, (¬y ∨ z), z, (¬y ∨¬z)〉,
R2 =
〈
(y ∨ z), z, (y ∨¬z)〉,
R3 =
〈
(y ∨ z), y, (¬y ∨ z)〉,
R4 =
〈
(y ∨ z)〉.
(9)
The sequent we wish to derive is
∅⇒ {¬(y ∨ z),¬(y ∨¬z),¬(¬y ∨ z),¬(¬y ∨¬z)}. (10)
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Following the mechanism in the theorem, for R1 we wish to deriveSβ(1) = {y, z}⇒
{¬(¬y ∨¬z)}.
This is obtained by
Sequent via Line
{y}⇒ {y} Axiom 1
{y,¬y}⇒ ∅ 1, (¬⇒) 2
{z}⇒ {z} Axiom 3
{z,¬z}⇒ ∅ 3, (¬⇒) 4
{y, z}, (¬y ∨¬z)⇒∅ 2,4, (∨⇒) 5
{y, z}⇒ {¬(¬y ∨¬z)} 5, (⇒¬) 6
Hence β(1)= 6.
For R2 the sequent required is
Sβ(2) = {z}⇒
{
(¬(y ∨¬z),¬(¬y ∨¬z)}
where we use the fact that ret(y, {z})= {z}, so that index(y, {z})= 6.
Sequent via Line
{z}, (y ∨¬z)⇒{¬(¬y ∨¬z)} 4,6, (∨⇒) 7
{z}⇒ {¬(¬y ∨¬z),¬(y ∨¬z)} 7, (⇒¬) 8
whence β(2) = 8. Notice that in deriving S7, LHS(S4) is viewed as {z},¬z and LHS(S6)
as {z}, y , i.e., with Γ = Γ ′ = {z}, A= ¬z, and B = y when the inference rule (∨⇒) of
Table 1 is used.
For R3 the sequent required is
Sβ(3) = {y}⇒
{¬(¬y ∨ z),¬(y ∨¬z),¬(¬y ∨¬z)},
where we use the fact that ret(z, {y})= ∅, so that index(z, {y})= 8.8
Sequent via Line
{y}, (¬y ∨ z)⇒{¬(¬y ∨¬z),¬(y ∨¬z)} 2,8, (∨⇒) 9
{y}⇒ {¬(¬y ∨¬z),¬(y ∨¬z),¬(¬y ∨ z)} 9, (⇒¬) 10
giving β(3)= 10.
Finally for R4 we have
ret(y,∅)= ∅ with index(y,∅)= 10,
ret(z,∅)= ∅ with index(z,∅)= 8,
8 Were ret(z, {y}) not subject to a minimality condition, it could also be chosen as {y}, giving index(z, {y})=
6. This choice would, in fact, still lead to a proof of the required final sequent. We also note the need for
index(z, {y}) to be maximal since LHS(S3)= {z}.
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so that using S8, S10 and (∨⇒) gives
S11 =
{
(y ∨ z)}⇒ {¬(¬y ∨¬z),¬(y ∨¬z),¬(¬y ∨ z)}
and with a single application of (⇒¬) to S11, we derive the required sequent
S12 = ∅⇒
{¬(y ∨ z),¬(y ∨¬z),¬(¬y ∨ z),¬(¬y ∨¬z)}.
The results above show that TPI–disputes can be interpreted as a proof calculus with which
to establish unsatisfiability of propositional formula presented in CNF, and that viewed
thus, the number of ‘moves’ taken to resolve a dispute—i.e., prove thatΦ is unsatisfiable—
is bounded below by the number of lines in the shortest derivation of ⇒¬Φ in a CUT-free
Gentzen System.
It may be shown that for any unsatisfiable CNF-formula Φ , the number of moves
required in a TPI-dispute over 〈HΦ,Φ〉 cannot be ‘much larger’ than the size of the smallest
clausal tableau refutation of Φ . An immediate consequence of this result being that the
propositional proof system afforded by TPI-disputes is polynomially equivalent—in sense
of [12]—to CUT-free Gentzen Systems and Clausal Tableaux, i.e., if 〈Π1,Π2〉 are any two
proof systems from
{Gentzen/CUT, Clausal Tableaux, TPI-dispute}
then the length of the shortest validity proofs of ¬Φ for CNF-formulae Φ in Π1 is at worst
polynomially larger than the length of the shortest proof in the system Π2. This follows
from the equivalence of Clausal Tableaux and CUT-free Gentzen Systems, details of which
may be found in [33, Chapter XI].
Definition 9. Let Φ(Zn) = ∧mi=1Ci be an unsatisfiable CNF-formula with clause set{C1,C2, . . . ,Cm}. A clausal tableau forΦ is a tree T (V,E) in which the non-leaf vertices,
v, are associated with a clause C(v) of Φ , in accordance with the following rules.
On any path ρ = v0 → v1 → ·· ·→ vr from the root (ρ) to a leaf vr , each clause Ci of
Φ labels at most one of {v0, v1, . . . , vr−1}. If ρ ∈ V is the root of T and C(ρ)=∨ki=1 yρ,i
the clause associated with ρ, then ρ has exactly k children—〈v1, v2, . . . , vk〉 with the edge
〈ρ, vj 〉 labelled yi,j . If v ∈ V is a non-leaf vertex (other than the root) let U be the set
of literals labelling edges on the (unique) path from ρ to v and C(v) =∨si=1 yv,i be the
clause associated with v. Again, v has exactly s children 〈w1,w2, . . . ,ws〉 with the edges
〈v,wi 〉 labelled yv,i . In this case, however, the vertex wi is a leaf labelled ⊥ if the literal
¬yv,i ∈ U . A vertex is closed if every path from it leads to a leaf (labelled ⊥). A clausal
tableau is a refutation for Φ if its root is closed.
The size of a clausal tableau T (V,E)—denoted τ (T )—is the total number of internal
vertices contained in it. The clausal tableau complexity of an unsatisfiable CNF-formula
Φ(Zn), is
τ
(
Φ(Zn)
) =
def
min
{
τ (T ): T is a clausal tableau refutation of Φ(Zn)
}
.
Theorem 6. Let Φ(Zn) =∧mi=1 Ci be an unsatisfiable CNF-formula and T (V,E) any
clausal tableau refutation of Φ(Zn), then δ(HΦ,Φ) (2n+ 1)τ (T ).
Proof. See [18]. ✷
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4. Discussion and further workIn this paper our primary goal has been to formalise the argument game (TPI-dispute)
introduced in [38] and to analyse this in terms of one particular computational measure—
dispute complexity. For what is technically the most interesting case—the length of dispute
required to convince Defenders of an argument that their position is untenable—we
have shown in Theorem 5 that applying this dispute regime to simple argument system
representations of propositional tautologies occasions a form of proof calculus. This
calculus is in one sense, however, extremely limited: any proof within it being capable of
description by a comparable length proof in a CUT-free Gentzen System. Since examples
are known of tautologies where allowing CUT admits exponentially shorter proofs9 the
protocol enforced by TPI-disputes when applied to certain propositional argument systems
may take significantly longer to reach a conclusion than ‘more powerful’ deductive
systems. We noted earlier, in describing the semantics of the RETRACT move that the
position reverted to is the initial argument, rather than some ‘intermediate’ state of the
dispute tree being developed. Among the reasons for favouring returning to the initial
position, is that the length of disputes (as indicated by our simulation using CUT-free
Gentzen Systems) does not, primarily, result from potentially repeating chains of defence
which will ultimately fail: if the retraction mechanism were to revert to a ‘sub-tree’ of the
dispute tree, cf. in a similar manner to that of the Challenger’s BACKUP move, then this
could be simulated from the initial argument just by repeating the relevant COUNTER and
BACKUP moves. Since the size of any dispute tree can be at most the number of arguments
within the system itself, a more sophisticated RETRACT semantics could only shorten the
length of a dispute by a polynomial factor—not reduce it exponentially.
Before dealing with some questions that are raised by the main result of this paper, it
may be useful to place our concerns in the general context of argument systems, dialogue
games, reasoning systems, etc. While the view of dialogue process as a 2-player game has
been long established, e.g., MacKenzie’s DC [27], interpretations of Toulmin’s Argument
Schema [34] as a game-based method [6], etc., the direction towards which such work has
tended is in attempting formally to capture different types of dialogue process: e.g., [22]
is, primarily, concerned with argument in a legal reasoning context. As a result there is
a wealth of differing models of dialogue ranging from taxonomies of dialogue types as
in Reed [32] and Walton and Krabbe [39] to frameworks modelling divers concepts of
what ‘winning’ a dialogue game might mean, e.g., [24]. Despite this variety of approaches,
one unifying trend is that the central concern is primarily semantic, i.e., in defining the
form(s) that games take, the rules and processes by which games evolve, the conditions
under which games terminate, and in establishing degrees of soundness and completeness
of the game capabilities. The question of how ‘efficient’ such processes might be, however,
seems to have been largely neglected, with the exception of general complexity-theoretic
classifications of Argumentation Frameworks within specific non-classical logics, e.g.,
[13–15] or analyses of termination properties. Thus, little work is evident concerning more
general contexts for the two questions which this paper has considered, i.e., with different
9 In fact, Urquhart [36], shows G/CUT can be weaker than simple truth-tables proving worst-case lower
bounds of /(n!) for the former as opposed to upper bounds of n2n for the latter.
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protocols for the conduct of dialogues, different attack semantics, concepts of ‘winning’
other than credulous acceptance. If practical applications of dialectic and reasoning games
are to be realised—as has become widely posited with the advent of autonomous agent
systems—then measures analogous to our concept of dispute complexity may be of
importance in evaluating implemented systems.
A rather different situation to that outlined in the preceding paragraph, pertains with
respect to concepts of Proof Complexity, that we have used as the basis of our analysis
of dispute complexity: Cook and Reckhow [12] introduced a formal mechanism for
comparing the complexity of different proof calculi so that two ‘different’ systems are
regarded as equipotent if a formal proof in one can be ‘simulated’ in the other with only
a small increase in size. An important feature of this approach is that it can be developed
to address questions concerning proof strategies for acceptance of instances in CO-NP-
problems other than UNSAT, e.g., the Graph Stability Number calculus of Chvátal [11],
or the Hajós Calculus for proving a graph has chromatic number greater than 3, [7,28].
It is the case, however, that these analyses are effectively only dealing with Classical
(Propositional) Logic, and such results as extend to non-classical Logics do so only by
virtue of propositional logic being treatable as a sub-case, e.g., Haken [23] trivially applies
to the Resolution Calculus for Temporal Logic of [20] simply by expressing the relevant
tautology without the use of any temporal operators, i.e., exactly as its propositional
form.
We conclude by reviewing some directions for further research, that encompass both
argument and dialogue game developments as well as extensions to the concept of dispute
complexity.
Within the framework of [12] while it is known that the Gentzen System G/CUT
is weaker than both the system G and Propositional Proof systems employing General
Resolution only, it is an open problem as to whether G and Resolution are equivalent,
i.e., it has yet to be shown that, e.g., the Pigeon-Hole Principle tautologies require
exponential length proofs in G, however no (efficient) simulation of G by Resolution has
been constructed. Theorems 5 and 6 establish that using the TPI-dispute protocol as a
vehicle for constructing proofs of propositional tautologies, ¬ϕ, affords a system which is
equivalent to G/CUT and Clausal Tableaux, thus we might represent the respective power
of various proof calculi for propositional tautologies informally as,
G  Resolution> (G/CUT ≡ TPI ≡ Clausal Tableaux). (11)
The situation depicted in (11) raises some interesting questions. Firstly, it may be noted
that Theorem 5 operates in only ‘one direction’, that is we express the problem of proving
a propositional formula to be a tautology as a problem of showing an argument is not
credulously accepted in an argument system, thence relating a calculus for the latter to a
calculus for the former. We have not considered, however, translations of argument systems
into propositional formulae. For example, given 〈H(X ,A), x〉, the CNF-formula ϕ〈H,x〉
over variables X is,
x ∧
∧
〈y,z〉∈A
(¬y ∨¬z)∧
∧
y∈X
(
y ∨
∨
{z: 〈z,y〉∈A}
z
)
. (12)
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It is easy to show that there is a stable extension ofH containing x if and only if ϕ〈H,x〉(X )
is satisfiable.10
Translations such as (12) also allow us to give a more precise interpretation of what
might be meant by ‘more powerful’ dispute protocol. Thus, let Π be a (2-player) dispute
protocol for argument systems (i.e., prescribing the repertoire of moves, state changes,
move applicability, termination conditions, etc.) with the properties that: given an instance
〈H, x〉 of CA
(a) Π can produce a successful defence of x if and only if x is credulously accepted inH.
(b) Π either always produces a successful defence or always results in a successful
rebuttal of x .
We can define analogous notions of dispute complexity with respect to arbitrary
protocols—say, δ(〈H, x〉,Π)—and hence regard protocol Π1 as ‘at least as powerful’ as
protocolΠ2 (denotedΠ1 Π2) if there is a constant k with which: for all dispute instances
〈H, x〉
δ
(〈H, x〉,Π1)=O(δ(〈H, x〉,Π2)k).
Problem 1. What features must be incorporated in a dispute protocol, Π , in order for it
to be more powerful than TPI? That is, for the dispute complexity of infinitely many TPI-
disputes to be superpolynomial in the dispute complexity of Π on the same instances.
Problem 2. Similarly, what features must be incorporated in Π for it to be at least as
powerful as General Resolution, Gentzen Systems, etc.?
It should be noted that there are subtle differences between Problems 1 and 2. The
former could be examined directly without recourse to phrasing in terms of propositional
proofs, the latter however is specifically concerned with the use of dispute protocols as a
propositional proof mechanism.
With respect to Problem 1 it has been observed earlier that something other than ‘local’
modifications to the state following a RETRACT move is needed.
A rather more general concern is that of what criteria must a ‘reasonable’ dispute
protocol satisfy. From complexity-theoretic considerations, the move repertoire and its
implementation cannot be permitted to be ‘too powerful’, e.g., treating as single operations
moves which are predicated on identifying structures in an argument graph whose
construction is NP-hard. While the TPI-dispute protocol is ‘realistic’ in the sense that the
applicability of a proposed move can be validated efficiently (this, of course, is not the same
as identifying a ‘best’ move), in addressing the issues raised by Problem 1 one may wish
10 Although it is possible to construct a (‘short’) CNF encoding ‘preferred extension containing x’ rather than
stable, this has a rather more opaque form. In any event since the absence of a preferred extension of x implies
the absence of a stable extension of x, for the constructions of interest (i.e., negative instances) the TPI-dispute
protocol defined still applies. Furthermore, Dimopoulos and Torres [16] show that deciding if H has a stable
extension containing a given argument x is also NP-complete.
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to restrict consideration to ‘reasonable’ protocols.11 It is, of course, unlikely (given the
conjecture NP = CO-NP) that there is a ‘reasonable’ dispute protocol capable of resolving
any dispute within a number of moves polynomial in the size of the argument system
concerned. Nevertheless, just as the fact that existing lower bounds on Proof Complexity
in failing to encompass all possible systems—as would be needed to prove NP = CO-NP—
motivates consideration of more powerful proof systems, so it is reasonable to examine
and precisely formulate ‘increasingly powerful’ dispute protocols.
Finally, even for ‘weak’ systems such as TPI-disputes in the case of instances which lead
to successful rebuttals of an argument, there is the issue of the Challenger constructing the
‘best’ line of attack, i.e., of finding the dispute that minimises dispute complexity. An
analogous situation in Proof Complexity was formulated in Bonet et al. [9]: suppose ϕ
is an unsatisfiable CNF with m clauses and n variables. Letting π(ϕ,S) denote the size
of the shortest proof of ¬ϕ in some Propositional Proof System S, then for a function,
q :N3 →N, S is said to be q-automatizable if there exists a (deterministic) algorithm that
produces a proof (in the system S) of¬ϕ in time q(π(ϕ,S), n,m). The cases of interest are
where q is polynomially bounded in π(ϕ,S). Informally, if a proof system is polynomially-
bounded automatizable, then this gives an algorithm that can ‘efficiently’ construct a proof
that is ‘not much larger’ than the optimal proof. The concept of q-automatizability can
be reformulated in the obvious way to refer to dispute complexity (or indeed verification
calculi for other CO-NP-complete problems). This motivates,
Problem 3. Let 〈H, x〉 be any TPI-dispute instance in which there are n arguments and
for which x is not credulously accepted in H. Is there a deterministic algorithm that in
q(δ(H, x), n) steps returns a terminated TPI-dispute M establishing a successful rebuttal
of x and with q bounded by a polynomial in δ(H, x)? In other words, is the TPI-dispute
protocol q-automatizable for some polynomial q?
To conclude our discussion of possible directions for further research, we note
that our model of dispute assumes both protagonists have complete knowledge of the
argument system (i.e., the finite directed graph structure). Thus the Defender may
choose counterattacks which are known to eliminate particular (subsequent) attacks by
the Challenger; similarly, as may be evinced by the development of the disputes from
unsatisfiable CNF-formulae, the Challenger may invoke attacks, potential defences to
which have been ruled out, e.g., when the Defender uses a literal y to attack a clause
C, the Challenger may continue using an available clause containing ¬y , knowing that ¬y
cannot be used as a defence. In many situations it may not be the case that such complete
knowledge is held ab initio. The modelling of disputes where the protagonists’ views of
the system evolve over several moves would provide a significant development of the
preliminary formalism described in this paper. Such an extension would have considerable
practical interest, since many of the implementations require such evolution. For example,
Gordon’s [22] game is intended to induce the participants to present the arguments that
11 Similar considerations arise in Proof Complexity and an accepted formalism has evolved to distinguish
‘reasonable’ from ‘unreasonable’ proof calculi. For the complexity-theoretic aspects affecting dispute protocols
such a formalism seems a plausible basis.
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they wish to deploy, essentially establishing the argumentation framework which will
be subsequently used when the question comes to trial. In [6] it is assumed that each
participant has only a partial view on the argumentation framework which is extended by
elements recognised by their opponents as the dialogue proceeds. If we consider disputes
between autonomous agents, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect them to begin with a shared
understanding of the overall argumentation framework.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a formal concept of dispute complexity with which
to consider questions regarding the number of moves required in a dialogue over a given
argument before one player accepts that the argument is/is not defensible. Building on the
Argument System formalism of [17] and the argument game—TPI-dispute—discussed in
[38], a precise formulation of the latter has been presented. With this formulation at hand,
we are able to prove that there are instances representing a win for the Challenger but
for which exponentially many moves must be played before the Defender is convinced
of this. Our techniques exploit the close relationship between such dispute protocols and
the concept of formal proof calculi for propositional tautologies by showing that the TPI-
dispute protocol applied to representations of these can be used to build a proof of validity
in a CUT-free Gentzen System whose length is comparable to the number of moves needed
in a TPI-dispute. The ideas and techniques put forward in this paper represent just a
preliminary foundation: an extensive range of open questions and further directions for
research arise from this, only a selection of which have been discussed.
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